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THE ‘OBJECTIVES’ AND ‘PRINCIPLES’ OF THE WTO TRIPS
AGREEMENT: A DETAILED ANATOMY
ALISON SLADE 1

1. Introduction

A striking feature of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)2 is the bold expression of purpose contained within the
operative sections of the text. While, it is commonplace to see broad declarations of intent
within the preambular sections of key international IP treaties,3 the TRIPS Agreement is the
first to articulate such objectives and give them apparent operative force. Articles 7 and 8
refer to the ‘Objectives’ and ‘Principles’ of the treaty regime respectively:

Article 7 - Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.

Article 8 - Principles
(1) Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
1

Brunel Law School, Brunel University London. Alison.slade@brunel.ac.uk. I would like to thank Professor
Graeme Dinwoodie and Professor Professor Benedict Chigara for their extensive and valuable comments on
earlier drafts. As always, any errors or omissions are my own.
2
1869 UNTS 299 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995).
3
See, for example, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 828 UNTS 221
(entered into force 9 September 1886, last amended 28 September 1979); and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996
36 ILM 65 (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002).
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sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
(2) Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by rights
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.

Their inclusion in Part I of the Agreement entitled ‘General Provisions and Basic Principles’,
recognises Articles 7 and 8 as ‘structural’ provisions that affect all other areas of the
Agreement.4 These provisions ‘overarch the object and purpose of individual standards of
protection in the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement.’5 Consequently, Articles 7 and 8 ‘are
to be systematically applied in the implementation and interpretation of the Agreement.’6 The
structural, overarching and systematic application of these provisions draws legal authority
from the General Rule of Interpretation codified in Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This states that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.’7 Established as binding on the WTO when interpreting
all covered agreements8, it prescribes a single and holistic rule of interpretation that
emphasises the importance of the treaty language. Nonetheless, any meaning attributed to the
text must be determined in the context of the treaty and in light of its object and purpose.9
Articles 7 and 8 feature in the application of VCLT rule of interpretation, most significantly

4

Graeme B Dinwoodie & Rochelle C Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the
International Intellectual Property Regime (OUP 2012) 109-111.
5
Susy Frankel, ‘Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes’ (2009)
12 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1023, 1037.
6
Carlos M. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS
Agreement (OUP 2007) 93.
7
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1153
UNTS 331.
8
WTO, United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline – Report of the Appellate Body
(29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, 15-16.
9
Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press 1984) 119-135.
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by providing context and object and purpose for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.10
Support for this understanding is derived from Article 31.2 of the VCLT which defines
context to include the entire text, preamble and annexes, as well as any connected agreements
or instruments that have been made between or accepted by all parties. Additionally,
designating Articles 7 and 8 as objectives and principles is a strong indication that these
provisions are relevant for assessing the treaty’s object and purpose.11 In fact, this specific
role for Articles 7 and 8 has subsequently been reinforced by the WTO Membership through
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.12
Given that Member States took positive steps to include expressions of general intent
within the operative section of the text, it is also remarkable that Articles 7 and 8 have
received only minimal attention from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).13 Much has
been written about the DSB’s insubstantial analysis and application of these provisions in
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products14 and European Communities –
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs15. In both cases the panels acknowledge these provisions, but seem to accept them

10

Susy Frankel, ‘WTO Application of “the customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to
Intellectual Property’ (2006) 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 366, 392. Andrew D Mitchell & Tania Voon, ‘Patents and Public
Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, (2009) 43 J. World Trade
571, 573. A brief discussion of the good faith obligations, including good faith interpretation derived from
Article 31.1 VCLT, can be found at the text accompanying footnotes 111-114. For a detailed discussion of the
good faith obligations created by Article 7 please refer to Alison Slade, ‘Good Faith and the TRIPS Agreement:
Putting Flesh on the Bones of the TRIPS ‘Objectives’’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 353.
11
Susy Frankel, ‘WTO Application of “the customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to
Intellectual Property’ (2006) 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 366, 392.
12
WTO, ‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – Adopted on 14 November 2001’ (20
November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [4] & [5].
13
In contrast, these articles have received significant attention from WTO political representatives and from the
academic community. For example, see WTO, ‘Communication from India – Clarifying TRIPS a ConfidenceBuilding Measure’ (6 October 2000) IP/C/W/214; WTO, ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 28-29 February 2012’
(15 May 2012) IP/C/M/69 [254]; Peter K Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2009)
46 Houston L. Rev. 979; Edson Beas Rodrigues Jr., The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement:
Promoting Sustainable Development (2012 CUP).
14
WTO, Canada: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products – Report of the Panel (17 March 2000)
WT/DS114/R (Canada – Pharmaceuticals).
15
WTO, European Communities: Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs (15 March 2005) WT/DS174 & 290/R (EC – TMs & GIs). For a critique of the DSBs
application of Articles 7 and/or 8 in these cases see, Slade (n 9) 353-357.
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as merely illustrative of the inherent characteristics of the international intellectual property
system, having little, if any, legal value in their own right. While, the decisions in Canada –
Term of Protection16 and US – s211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 199817 suggest a more
active role, most notably with Article 7 acting as ‘a form of the good faith principle,’ neither
panel takes the opportunity to provide a detailed understanding. Consequently, the following
analysis undertakes a dissection of the legislative language within Articles 7 and 8 in order to
better realise their meaning, relevance and application.
As stressed by the WTO Appellate Body, ‘The fundamental rule of treaty interpretation
requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the words actually used by the agreement
under examination.’18 As discussed above, the ordinary meaning attributed to the words used
must be made in light of a treaty’s context, and object and purpose. Yet, if we follow the
VCLT principle of treaty interpretation the analysis becomes somewhat circular – Articles 7
and 8 provide context, and object and purpose for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement,
but it is necessary first to interpret these provisions before they can be utilised in that role. As
observed by Buffard and Zemanek:
[When interpreting ‘programmatic’ provisions of a treaty it is] evident that the
process of interpretation prescribed by Article 31 para.1 of the VCLT can only be
used with modification for that end. It is not possible to be guided in the
interpretation of a treaty by its object and purpose when those have to be elucidated

16

WTO, Canada: Term of Patent Protection – Report of the Appellate Body (18 September 2000)
WT/DS170/AB/R.
17
WTO, United States: Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 – Report of the Panel (6 August 2001)
WT/DS176/R (US – s211).
18
WTO, European Communities: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Report of the
Appellate Body (16 January 1998) WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R [181] (emphasis added).
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first by interpreting the treaty.19
Yet, how are such provisions to be interpreted? The VCLT is silent on how to establish the
object and purpose of a treaty, or how to interpret provisions that seek to express such general
intent.20 According to Sir Ian Sinclair, when seeking the object and purpose of a treaty ‘the
text is the expression of the intention of the parties; and it is to that expression of intent that
one must first look.’21 The following analysis will, therefore, be structured according to the
individual textual elements expressed within Articles 7 and 8. Yet, Jan Klabbers cautions
against using text alone to define a treaty’s object and purpose:
[U]ndue reliance on the text alone may result in losing sight of the object and
purpose of the treaty itself, and instead give rise to propositions relating to object
and purpose of singular provisions or parts of provisions, thus resulting in a
blunting of the analytical potential of the notion of object and purpose.22
To avoid this interpretative trap, the analysis of the specific words and phrases will call upon
other relevant materials to add authoritative meaning to the text. These sources include, inter
alia, other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; subsequent agreements between the parties;
the wider WTO legal system; and the policy foundations of intellectual property protection
and the multilateral trading system. While having recourse to a wide range of supporting
materials, the author recognises that ‘introducing obligations through the back door of object
and purpose, after those have been refused entry through the front door’ should be avoided.23

19

Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, ‘The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Aust. Rev.
Int’l and Euro. L. 311, 333. See also, David S Jonas & Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose of a
Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods’ (2010) 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 565, 581-582.
20
Marco Slotboom, A Comparison of WTO and EC Law: Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty
Interpretation? (Cameron May 2006) 53.
21
Sinclair (n 8) 131. This approach reinforces the Article 31.1 emphasis on the text as the primary source of
interpretative guidance.
22
Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ (1997) 8 Finnish Yearbook of
International Law 138, 157.
23
Ibid 159.
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This is especially so in light of Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) which makes it clear that the ‘Recommendations and Rulings of the DSB cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’24 Therefore, in
order to balance this interpretative caution against the need to operationalise Articles 7 and 8,
the analysis remains firmly grounded in the language actually used, and the supporting
materials are those that can be sensibly rationalised in the international IP context.25 This is
not to say that the following expresses the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement in its
entirety; or that it is the definitive word on the interpretation and application of Articles 7 and
8. It is accepted that defining the object and purpose of a treaty ‘in abstracto’ will rarely
produce a conclusive result.26 Nevertheless, where directly expressed object and purpose
exist, as with Articles 7 and 8, the hope is that by conducting an detailed analyses of the
individual textual elements greater analogies can be made with existing legal rules and
principles. This will augment existing academic writings to provide a meaningful insight into
how these steering provisions can be given full effect by State Parties and those interpreting
the TRIPS Agreement.27
The replication of Articles 7 and 8 within the operative sections of other international
and national intellectual property instruments underscores this growing need for a deeper
understanding. The language of these provisions can now be found in the final text of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),28 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),29 the

24

Understanding on the Rules Governing Disputes 1994 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January
1995) 1869 UNTS 40, art 3.2.
25
Nevertheless, Jan Klabbers does note that indicators of object and purpose are wide ranging and in some cases
even ‘intuition and common sense’ may provide useful guidance. Klabbers (n 21) 155.
26
Klabbers (n 21) 160; Jonas & Saunders (n 18) 582. The authors note that the meaning of object and purpose
depends not only on the treaty alone, but its application to a particular factual problem.
27
Pedro Roffe (UNCTAD-ICTSD), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (CUP 2005) 119-127; Yu (n 6)
982-992; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (4th edn, Thomson, Sweet and
Maxwell 2012) 227-241; Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data (4th edn, Wolters
Kluwer 2014).
28
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Chapter 18, articles 18.2 and 18.3. https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text accessed 9 April 2016.
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WIPO Development Agenda,30 and the amended Indian Patents Act 1970.31 It is clear that
despite an apparent wane in the influence of the TRIPS Agreement, due to the proliferation of
bi-lateral and regional agreements,32 these structural provisions (and the aims and concerns
articulated therein) are independently acquiring an ever wider relevance.33 Reproducing these
provisions advocates an enhanced legal and political status in both national and international
IP norm setting for the objectives and principles contained therein.34 While it may be
somewhat premature to suggest that these provisions are a customary part of the international
IP system, their growing use evidently necessitates a more detailed understanding.
As will be demonstrated below, fundamentally Articles 7 and 8 require those interpreting
the TRIPS Agreement to look at interests beyond those directly related to the acquisition and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.35 In this regard, these provisions reflect, at the
international level, the balancing of interests that has consistently been undertaken at the
national level.36 Given that Articles 7 and 8 acknowledge that intellectual property protection
is inescapably aligned with other important national development objectives, it seems that,
above all, they ought to reinforce national autonomy and, thus, deference to national policy
choices.37 As articulated by Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘international
[intellectual property] norms confine national policy choices, but they do not define
29

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Final Draft (May 2011), article 2.3. https://ustr.gov/acta accessed 9
April 2016.
30
WIPO, ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda’(October 2007)
Recommendation 45. http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html accessed 9 April
2016.
31
India – s83 Patents Act 1970.
32
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Intellectual Property and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment’ in H. Ullrich,
R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping and J Drexl, TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (Springer 2015).
33
Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 164.
34
Alison Slade, ‘Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: A Force for Convergence within the International IP
System’ (2011) 14 JWIP 413.
35
Jerzy Koopman, ‘Human Rights Implications of Patenting Biotechnological Knowledge’ in Paul L.C.
Torresmans, Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2008) 546.
36
Roffe (n 26) 119.
37
TRIPS Agreement, art 1.1 states that ‘Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.’ See also WTO,
India: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products – Report of the Appellate Body (19
December 1997) WTO/DS50/AB/R [59] (India – Pharmaceuticals).
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them.’38 It is only at the national level that the competing economic and social interests
reproduced in these provisions can be reconciled. In that regard, Article 7 and 8 would appear
to allow each State significant room to self-determine appropriate levels of intellectual
property protection. Accordingly, the following analysis articulates a prevailing principle of
national regulatory authority (subject to the WTO requirements of consistency, necessity and
reasonableness).39 This being the cardinal approach to effectively elucidating the objectives
and principles of the TRIPS Agreement and to give them practical effect.
The observations made below will touch upon numerous topics, each provoking a
myriad of issues and complexities, such as the precise interpretative impact on other
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement or the support these provisions provide for a human
rights framework within the context of the WTO. However, the intention here is not to
address each of these issues in turn, but to specifically analyse the meaning and scope of the
text of these provisions. It is only with a more comprehensive understanding of how Articles
7 and 8 may be interpreted that many of these intricate and complex questions will be better
addressed by the WTO, its Member States, and all those that adhere to other national and
international agreements in which these provisions are incorporated.

2. Article 7 - Objectives

Objective: - Of or pertaining to the object or end as the cause of action.40

38

Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 112.
In April 2014, the Max-Planck Institute released a ‘Declaration on Patent Protection’. It forcefully asserted
that ‘Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological
capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities.’ Max Planck Institute for
Innovation and Competition, ‘Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS’
(Munich, 15 April 2014) https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf accessed 9 April 2016.
40
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2nd edn, OUP 1989).
39
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As the dictionary definition suggests, the fundamental rationale of the TRIPS Agreement is to
realise the aims as expressed within Article 7. For this reason Article 7 provides significant
insight into that often posed question – what were the drafters’ intentions?41 It reminds us of
the role that intellectual property rights play in incentivising creativity and innovation, yet
alerts us to its detrimental side-effects. During negotiations many countries stressed the
central role intellectual property protection plays in the process of innovation. Yet, many
others, particularly developing countries, wished to recognise and also actively correct the
negative impact that such protection may have on economic and social development.42
Therefore, Article 7 requires a middle ground to be reached that optimises innovation,
promotes social and economic development, while at the same time lessening the detrimental
consequences of intellectual property protection.
Article 7 is certainly not a comprehensive expression of all the goals of the TRIPS
Agreement.43 Nevertheless, it is the first attempt at defining the underlying rationale of a
multilateral intellectual property instrument.44 In short, Article 7 invokes, at the international
level, many of the implicit balancing principles that have historically been fundamental to
national levels of intellectual property protection.45 Additionally, Article 7 unites these

41

Yu (n 12) 1022.
For an analysis of the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement see Duncan Matthews, Globalising
Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPs Agreement (Routledge 2002) 29-45; Gervais (n 26) 3-31.
43
The Preamble is considered to contain the ‘general goals’ of the TRIPS Agreement, predominant amongst
which is recital 1. However, these ‘general goals’ should be read in conjunction with the objectives expressed in
Article 7. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual
Property Protection’ in Paul L C Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law
International 2008) 173-175; Abdulqawi A Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’ in
Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement
(Kluwer Law International 2008) 11; Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager and Jayashree Watal (eds), A Handbook
on the WTO TRIPS Agreement (CUP 2012) 12-13.
44
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 110.
45
Ibid.
42
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national principles with the broader objectives of the WTO as outlined in the recitals to the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.46 Michael Spence observes that:
[L]ike the first recital to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, [Article 7]
expresses a concern for increased global welfare. Similarly, like the second recital
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, it demonstrates a particular concern for
developing countries which might be assumed to benefit most from the transfer
and dissemination of technology.47
Notwithstanding these comments, Spence draws attention to the difficulties inherent in a
provision that promotes two highly contested functions of the intellectual property system –
the promotion of innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology. He argues that
this makes Article 7 an inadequate tool with which to identify and justify the intellectual
property rights that ought to be included in the TRIPS Agreement.48 Could this be an
underestimation of the drafters intended function(s) for Article 7? The provision is certainly
concerned with validating the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, by assessing whether current
intellectual property regimes can actually realise the stated objectives. However, in being the
first provision within an international intellectual property instrument to articulate a set of
guiding principles, Article 7 appears to be more widely concerned with the function and aims
of the TRIPS Agreement within the legal systems of both the WTO and the individual
Member States. It goes beyond providing an introduction to the scope of the Agreement, to
prescribing a set of outcomes that are to guide the political and legal interpreters of the
TRIPS Agreement. Hence, it seeks to achieve an optimal level of intellectual property
protection aligned to distinct levels of economic and social development. Crucially, the

46

Michael Spence. ‘Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?’ in F. Francioni and M. Scovazzi
(eds), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Hart 2001) 263, 265.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid, 265-274.
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appropriate standard of protection will be achieved when the objectives listed in Article 7 are
attained at the national level.49
Accordingly, it would be misguided to argue that the objectives expressed in Article 7
require a rigid international optimisation of intellectual property standards. First, such an
approach would misunderstand the nature of the TRIPS Agreement. It is an instrument which
lays down a minimum set of intellectual property rules.50 For instance, there is nothing within
the Agreement which prevents Members from adopting higher thresholds of protection if
Members determine that such would be more conducive to achieving the objectives set out in
Article 7.51 More importantly the TRIPS Agreement includes numerous ‘flexibilities’ that, if
interpreted in accordance with Articles 7 and 8, provide sufficient elbow room for Member
States to tailor their intellectual property regimes to reflect their own unique economic and
social circumstances.52 Secondly, optimal levels of intellectual property protection have been
notoriously difficult to determine, measure and achieve even at the national level.53
Consequently, any attempt to attain international optimisation would be naively optimistic
and necessarily involve complex calculations of economic and social welfare that would
prove impossible to resolve. As will be shown below, an analysis of the terminology utilised
within Article 7 supports the state-centric nature of the balancing of interests required.

(a) The Terms of Article 7
49

Wesley A Cann Jr, ‘On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of LessDeveloped Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under A Theory of
Progressive Global Constitutionalism’ (2004) 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 755, 808; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3)
111.
50
Roffe (n 26) 35.
51
Article 1.1 states that, ‘Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by the Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions
of this Agreement.’
52
WIPO, ‘Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement’, http://www.wipo.int/ipdevelopment/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html accessed 9 April 2016.
53
Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International Economics,
2000) 28.
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(i) ‘The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights...’

The opening phrase of this provision makes clear that the application of Article 7 extends not
only to the scope and nature of the rights granted, but also to the enforcement measures
covered by the TRIPS Agreement. More expansively, the focus of the provision is the
broader impact of ‘intellectual property rights’, and not merely as a tool to reconcile one
provision of TRIPS with another. This has led Peter Yu to conclude that: [Article 7] therefore anticipates further balancing within the larger international
trading system. As the WTO Panel declared in United States – Section 110(5) of
the U.S. Copyright Act, “the agreements covered by the WTO form a single,
integrated legal system.” Because “[t]he proper balance of rights and obligations
is an overriding objective of the WTO system,” the objectives and principles of
the TRIPS Agreement need to be considered in relation to this particular
objective.54

Therefore, the objectives contained within Article 7 need to be explored not merely within
the discrete application of the TRIPS Agreement but within the wider context of the WTO
trading system. Viewed as a whole, the WTO structure regards an optimised trading system
as one that acknowledges a wider purpose. As stated in the opening recital to Agreement
Establishing the World Trading Organisation: Parties to this Agreement recogniz[e] that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development.55
54
55

Yu (n 12) 1007 -1008 (citations omitted).
(adopted 14 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 154.
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Recital 2 goes further in recognising that positive action needs to be taken to ensure that
developing and least developed nations ‘secure a share in the growth of international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development’. The Appellate Body has
confirmed the unified framework and ‘single undertaking’ nature of the WTO Agreement,56
thereby making the WTO’s development objectives applicable to all its Annexes, including
the TRIPS Agreement.
Bearing in mind that intellectual property protection creates legal rights with
monopolistic tendencies, it would be right to assume that the characterisation and scope of
the rights involved should be determined in light of the public interest criteria mentioned
above. Particular consideration should be given to the level of social and economic
development of each State Party and any circumstances that requires the moderation of
recognised rights. Any failure in this regard could undermine the legitimacy of international
intellectual property regimes including TRIPS, the WTO and the multilateral trading system
that it aims to facilitate.57

(ii) ‘should contribute to...’

This phrase marks Article 7 as a provision which contains the primary aims or goals of the
Agreement. The assumption is that upon implementation Member States should seek to

56

WTO, Brazil: Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut-Report of the Appellate Body (21 February 1997)
WT/DS22/AB/R, 13-14.
57
Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the
Public Domain of Science under International Law’ in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman (eds),
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realize all the objectives contained within Article 7. Hence, this provision expresses standards
expected of a successfully functioning intellectual property regime.
Much has been made about Article 7 being a ‘should’ provision rather than a ‘shall’
provision.58 The argument maintains that the word ‘shall’ places a mandatory obligation on
the parties to an agreement, yet the use of ‘should’ indicates a lesser obligation that only
encourages parties to achieve the stated aims. This latter approach regards Article 7 as merely
hortatory or aspirational in nature.59 If we accept this distinction, then as a substantive
provision the Article 7 objectives will always be superseded by ‘shall’ provisions or their
equivalent.
However, it is generally accepted that the value of Article 7 rests in its ability to steer the
interpretation of these ‘shall’ provisions and not to form the content of a substantive
obligation.60 If this is the case then the distinction appears to be irrelevant. It is not then a
case of weighing discrete substantive provisions, but of interpreting the substantive
provisions. The ‘should’ provision then adopts the role of determining what ‘shall’ be
achieved. As observed by Pedro Roffe, in the UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS
and Development, ‘[C]ountries should frame the applicable rules so as to promote
technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology “in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare.”’61 The ‘should’ in this instance recognises that
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights does not always result in the
various outcomes listed in Article 7, but that it ‘should’ do so.62 In fact, in some instances the
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protection of intellectual property rights will not encourage creative output63 and can even
stifle the innovation that it aims to promote. Consequently, Article 7 carries an interpretative
function that directs the application of the Agreement to achieve the stated objectives. This
makes the word ‘should’ central to the whole provision. Therefore, the ‘should’ in Article 7
indicates an obligation, the nature of which is interpretative rather than substantive.
The phrase ‘contribute to’ is also of note in the provision. Throughout the negotiation of
the TRIPS Agreement the protection of intellectual property rights was often promoted as a
panacea for many of the social and economic problems facing developing countries. In short,
by implementing higher standards of national intellectual property protection, States would
encourage corporations to transfer their products or services to the protecting state and even
work them locally. This would lead to the transfer of technology to these nations, thereby
advancing economic expansion and thus resulting in high standards of living and social
development. Yet the expression ‘contribute to’ confirms that intellectual property protection
can never be such a panacea. It can only be one of many factors that operate together to
promote innovation and the dissemination of information and technology.64 In this regard,
Article 7 acknowledges the linkages that exist between intellectual property and other factors
of development and requires that such protection is sympathetic to a State’s level of social
and economic development.65

(iii)‘the promotion of technological innovation...’
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A primary justification for the intellectual property system is the incentive it provides for
advancement in many fields. The introduction of the TRIPS Agreement extends that stimulus
beyond national boundaries. The claim that intellectual property protection can promote
innovation is premised upon the notion that protectable subject matter is a ‘public good’.
Innovation, unlike real property, is non-exhaustible. Once produced it can be utilised
extensively without depleting the social value of the original.66 While this in itself is not
especially problematic, the difficulties arise when the creator wishes to exclude others from
its utilisation once the subject matter has been disclosed to the public. The new development
or creation can often be reproduced with little cost or effort on the part of others, thus
removing or severely limiting the market for the original product or process. By granting a set
of exclusive rights, for a set period of time, rights holders are able to exclude others from
commercially exploiting the protected subject matter. This enhances the opportunity to
recoup the expenditure incurred in developing the product or service and increases the
prospect of additional financial rewards by securing the market for the rights holder.
Accordingly, in light of intellectual property protection, an individual or corporation can
create and exploit the manifestation of their efforts secure in the knowledge that a competitor
cannot ‘free-ride’ at their expense. This rationale behind intellectual property protection is
often difficult to reconcile with those of free trade and its underlying philosophies – the
former being ‘protectionist’ and the latter being ‘pro-competitive.’67 Yet, it does reflect the
view that intellectual property protection aims to serve the broader interests of society
through the encouragement of innovation and creation, and the transfer of that knowledge to
others.68 This latter point will be considered in more detail below.
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An important distinction has been made between the use of the term ‘technical
innovation’ over that of ‘technical invention’.69 The former is taken to refer to a fully
functioning and marketable product that may take the form of an inventive and completely
self-supporting product or process, or it may be an existing product or process that includes a
newly inventive component. By contrast, the term invention is understood to characterize the
early implementation of the new idea or concept itself, i.e. a model or prototype.70 Thus, the
TRIPS Agreement suggests that the intellectual property regime it defines is not merely
concerned with incentivising creativity or inventiveness at its earliest stages, but with
incentivising the production of new products or processes that can demonstrate some
practical application and/or trading capability. Prima facie, this appears to run counter to the
substantive rules of many national intellectual property systems, in particular patent law.
While patent law requires that a protectable invention demonstrate some utility,71 it is
recognised that in many jurisdictions this is not an onerous prerequisite to patent grant.72 As
long as the invention is capable73 of some use in industry or agriculture, it is not necessary to
provide evidence of actual operation in such a setting.74 However, as mentioned above,
Article 7 does not directly prescribe any substantive rules. Rather, it imposes a set of
optimised outcomes. Innovation, as a useful end-product, yields the greatest benefits for
69
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society and it is this that underscores the Article 7 objective. Invention without application,
while intellectually meritorious, is economically ineffective, as it does not provide the
necessary financial incentives for further advancement. Yet, to impose too high a threshold of
utility or industrial application could undermine the production of innovation. Although
patent law sets a low threshold for industrial application it does so on the basis that too
onerous a standard could undermine the next stated objective of the TRIPS Agreement,
namely, dissemination. The granting of patents at the earlier stage of the innovation process
encourages disclosure of the invention and thereby their subsequent utilisation in the ultimate
quest for functional results.75
Nevertheless, the claim that intellectual property protection can promote innovation is
highly contested.76 It has been noted that levels of intellectual property protection, as applied
in the developed nations, is not likely to promote innovation in countries which do not have
the necessary infrastructure and capabilities to support such activities.77 In fact, by virtue of
their monopolistic tendencies intellectual property rights can actually operate to suppress
innovation in both developing and developed countries.78 In this context Article 7 operates to
facilitate an equilibrium between the incentivisation capacity of the intellectual property
system and the negative impacts of monopolistic rights.79
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One further point that must be made is the curious limitation to certain types of subject
matter – technological innovation. Interestingly, a broad definition of ‘innovation’, denoting
‘the introduction of novelties or the alteration of what is established by the introduction of
new elements or forms,’80 is wide enough to encompass all forms of creative activity, i.e.
cultural, commercial or technological. Does this mean that Article 7 only has application
when certain types of intellectual property are involved, i.e. patents, the layout designs of
integrated circuits, certain trade secrets, and copyright when protecting technical creations
such as software?81 This question is especially pertinent given that the reference to
‘technology’ is also repeated in other phrases within Article 7.
Correa writes that the terminology adopted may not signal a deliberate limitation by
those negotiating the Agreement. In fact, it may have been a mere oversight on the part of the
developing countries who, during negotiations, were preoccupied with the impact the
protection of technology related innovation would have upon access to certain products and
services.82 This reasoning is supported by paragraph 19 of the 2001 Ministerial Declaration.83
This paragraph requires that the objectives and principles, as set out in Articles 7 and 8, guide
the Council for TRIPS when examining the relationship between intellectual property and
non-technical subject matter including traditional knowledge and folklore; and subject matter
covered by the Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is no doubt that patent law is
an important consideration in these relationships, other non-technical elements of intellectual
property law, such as copyright, are also of relevance and are to be guided by the terms of
Article 7. Furthermore, the latter objectives of Article 7 seemingly refer to all intellectual
property rights within the TRIPS Agreement, requiring them to be applied in a ‘manner
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conducive to social and economic welfare’ and in a way that achieves ‘a balance of rights and
obligations.’84
Complications would also arise if Article 7 was deemed to have application for only
technological innovation, as it would require a definition to be attributed to ‘technology’ for
the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. As documented by commentators and the courts, this
approach is fraught with difficulties. Justine Pila observes that: [T]he term “technology”, which, and as social theorists have again recognized, is
too opaque and elastic to be informative. Indeed, philosophers of technology have
noted the “bewildering variety of ways of understanding the word
‘technology”’, and the difficulty of formulating a conception that is “neither so
general that it risks vacuity by fitting every conceivable case, nor so specialized
that it captures only a tiny range of the phenomena to be explained.”85

However, one cannot ignore the possibility that the intention was to limit the application
of Article 7 only to protectable technology. Yet this in no way diminishes importance of
Article 7 as a structural provision for guiding those tasked with interpreting the substantive
content of the treaty’s provisions. It only refines its scope.

(iv) ‘and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,...’

Another primary justification for intellectual property protection is the value it holds for the
dissemination of knowledge and the transfer of technology both nationally and
internationally. The utility of the intellectual property system rests not merely in protecting
the interests of the rights holder, but in doing so for the wider public interest. The protection
84
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of intellectual property is often premised upon social contract theories: society grants the
inventor or creator a selection of exclusive rights and in return the inventor or creator grants
full disclosure – the ‘intellectual property bargain.’86 Thus, the system is of wider interest to
society who are now free to use that knowledge and information (albeit, subject to the
requisite licensing arrangements). This in turn fosters further innovation, creation and
improvement.
A distinction must be drawn between transfer and dissemination. While these two
concepts are similar in their objectives – widening access to information – the transfer of
technology has a greater connection with access to information through industry. Effective
intellectual property protection reassures rights holders that their intellectual assets will be
protected and thereby encourages a willingness to transfer valuable knowledge to others
through, for example, licensing agreements and training programmes that see the rights
holder and the recipient working in partnership.87 Whereas, ‘dissemination’ appears to refer
to both the informal mechanisms of information dispersal, such as internet transmission,88
and the formal disclosure requirements of the intellectual property system itself, such as the
‘sufficiency’ requirement of patent law.89
It is well documented that the promise of international technology transfer in return for
stronger intellectual property standards was a key incentive for developing countries in
accepting the incorporation of intellectual property regulation within the framework of the
WTO. 90 Here Article 7 expressly integrates this objective within the text of the Agreement
itself. This provision together with Articles 8.2 and 66.2 create a reciprocal obligation for
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developed nations to actively facilitate technology transfer, particularly to those nations in
need of assistance in generating a ‘sound and viable technological base.’91
However, once again the narrower understanding of Article 7, in promoting the transfer
and dissemination of technology, may impact upon the scope of the provision. Nevertheless,
the transfer and dissemination of protected subject matter which is not technological in nature
may in fact lead to the transfer and dissemination of associated technological information and
know-how via foreign direct investment in local production.92 As observed by Michael
Spence, if a developing country provides strong copyright protection for the creative arts,
such as film production or literary publishing, a foreign organisation may be willing to set up
an operation in that country bringing with them the technological information and know-how
of the industry.93 In addition, the transfer and dissemination of protected technological
subject matter may be dependant on adequate intellectual property protection for associated
non-technological material, such as trade marks.94 An organisation may be unwilling to
licence patented technology without being secure in the knowledge that their marketing assets
will also be adequately protected.
In summary, the inclusion of ‘the transfer and dissemination of technology’ in Article 7
seeks to remind those implementing and interpreting the Agreement that the principal
objective of incentivisation cannot be understood in isolation from the equally important
objective of dissemination. The diffusion of knowledge and information sought must also be
understood to emanate from both formal and informal channels of communication. To ignore
or subvert this objective would disturb the overriding public interest objectives of the whole
intellectual property system.
91
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(v) ‘to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge...’

This objective seeks to refocus the nature of the Agreement. Whilst the Preamble states that
an objective of the TRIPS Agreement is the ‘effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights,’95 this objective in Article 7 aims to reaffirm that higher standards of
intellectual property protection are not an end in themselves.96 Historical justifications for
intellectual property protection regard the protection of rights holders’ interests as a means to
an end. That end being the wider interest of the public in having access to innovative
technological and cultural products.97 As discussed, intellectual property policy grants rights
of exclusion in return for the adequate disclosure of the protected work.
In addition, this language in Article 7 draws a parallel with the substantive sections of
the TRIPS Agreement. Here Article 7 is concerned with user access which is chiefly reflected
in the ‘exception’ provisions, such as Article 13 (copyright), Article 17 (trade marks), and
Article 30 (patents). Correa observes that ‘users’ in this context can be taken to mean both the
consumers of end products and producers wishing to use the protected subject matter in their
own production processes.98 Therefore, not only does the TRIPS Agreement provide
protection for producers of technological and cultural products, it also provides for the rights
of the users of such products. Furthermore, ‘users’ of technological innovation could refer to
many developing countries themselves. As net importers of protected technologies they are
‘largely users of technologies produced abroad.’99 This means that the requirement of
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‘mutual advantage’ applies not only between producers and direct consumers, but also
between producers and the broader interests of a developing state.
Having acknowledged that the TRIPS Agreement covers a range of competing interests,
Article 7 rather obscurely identifies how those interests are to relate to one another. The
Agreement is to be interpreted and applied ‘to the mutual advantage of producers and users’.
Clearly the intention is to find a balance between the various interests that is equally
advantageous to both producers and users.100 Producers will wish to be guaranteed a
sufficient period of exclusive protection to allow them to recoup their investment. Users will
wish to gain access to the product as soon as possible to further their business or research. In
the case of governments, they will wish to enhance the public interest as appropriate to their
level of development. The balance to be drawn in a fine one and can be difficult to articulate.
To overprotect creative and innovative products risks stifling further innovation and delays
the entry of competition into the marketplace. Yet, a policy that too readily favours users’
access can weaken the incentive effect of intellectual property protection, and reduce
innovative and creative output. Further, it could result in creative or technological
advancements being protected by alternative legal means that do not directly facilitate the
dissemination of information, i.e. trade secret law.101
The challenges to identifying the appropriate balance are polarised when intellectual
property protection stands in the way of achieving important social welfare objectives.
Nevertheless, it is important not to try to over-clarify the balance required. Over-clarification
can result in rigidity in application and absurdity in outcomes. National development
objectives as well as specific factual situations vary greatly. For example, patent protection is
often promoted as vital for R&D in the pharmaceutical industry, which requires a period of
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exclusivity to recoup their substantial investment.102 However, the effect on those that require
access to a particular drug is a question of degree and varies between states. In some
instances the result is expensive, yet still accessible, healthcare medication, in others,
individuals and governments are unable to purchase the necessary medication leading to
debilitating and often catastrophic results.103 Hence, national regulatory determinations in
accordance with the level of social and economic development are to be respected when
within the boundaries of international legal requirements.

(vi) ‘and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,...’

This phrase has been held to signify that ‘the recognition and enforcement of intellectual
property rights are subject to higher social values.’104 The protection of intellectual property,
predominantly influenced by utilitarianism,105 can never mean that all aspects of intellectual
property protection will always be conducive to social and economic welfare. The rights that
are granted by governments and legislature can and sometimes do have negative
consequences, including the entrenchment of monopolistic practices that run counter to
elementary economic policy. However, this is regarded as a ‘necessary evil’106 that must be
tolerated to bring about greater economic and social benefits. The granting of exclusive rights
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incentivises further creation, innovation and improvement which are seen as desirable. The
predominant objective is to achieve a balance between the problems that the scarcity of
production creates with the benefits that intellectual property protection brings for
encouraging creation.

(vii)

‘and to a balance of rights and obligations.’

The inclusion of this phrase confirms that intellectual property protection does not exist in a
vacuum. Once again the emphasis is on recognising that protecting intellectual property
rights is not the end objective,107 but is to be balanced against other obligations arising both
within the TRIPS Agreement and beyond.
Accordingly, Member States when implementing their obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement must ensure that they do so in a manner that obtains the correct balance. When it
comes to procedural obligations, the TRIPS Agreement provides some limited guidance as to
what the correct balance between rights and obligations is to be. For example, Article 29
places a condition of disclosure on the grant of patents. However, beyond this procedural
guidance, there is no definitive indication of what the correct substantive balance might be.
We can look to other expressions within Article 7 which promote innovation, technology
transfer and dissemination, and social and economic welfare, but again these merely establish
a desired outcome without clear guidance for the obtaining the correct balance of rights and
obligations.
That being said, it is possible to draw some guidance from the rest of the TRIPS
Agreement. The individual subject matter sections of the TRIPS Agreement establish the
107
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nature of the rights that are to be granted. In turn, in each of the subject matter sections
Members may provide for exceptions to the rights conferred. These exceptions are clearly
meant to integrate obligations that arise to others, and that the Member State deems to be
relevant for both economic and social welfare.108 The exceptions to the substantive rights are
generally cast in rather ambiguous terms, not making the relationship between the rights and
exceptions particularly clear. Yet it is here that Article 7 may take on its most informative
role. In interpreting the exceptions in the Agreement and their relationship with the rights
granted, all the terms within Article 7 can work to guide the interpreter on how to achieve the
correct balance of rights and obligations. The exceptions to the Agreement are the
instruments through which the objectives contained within Article 7 are realised.109 The
interpretative function of Article 7 is supplemented by the same function in relation to Article
8 and by other provisions of the Agreement that seek to control the rights of the intellectual
property owner, such as those relating to anti-competitive practices.110
Article 7 has broader application beyond balancing the rights and obligations that arise
under the TRIPS Agreement itself. Concerns that arise in relation to rights and obligations
occurring outside of the intellectual property and trade arena need to be observed as part of
the application of Article 7. As noted by Cottier and Véron, an example of this broader
balancing is expressed in Article 16.5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This
requires cooperation between contracting parties to ensure that patents and other intellectual
property rights ‘are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives,’ while achieving
compliance with national and international laws in the area.111
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Notably, the decision of the Panel in US – s211112 provides significant insight into what
it means for states to achieve a ‘balance of rights and obligations.’ The Panel observed that:

[A]rticle 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that one of the objectives is that “the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute…to a
balance of rights and obligations.” We consider this expression to be a form of the
good faith principle…One application of this principle, the doctrine widely known
as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s right.

In a previous paper, I have argued that this statement may lead Article 7 to be recognised as
an effective source of legal obligations within the TRIPS Agreement, invoking both
interpretative and substantive commitments under the principle of good faith.113 This is a
significant development. It assimilates into the TRIPS Agreement legal concepts that are not
explicit within the text, and expressly recognises Article 7 as their source. For example, by
analysing the jurisprudence of the WTO it is possible to identify several good faith
corollaries, such as pacta sunt servanda and the principles of effectiveness and legitimate
expectations.114 These place obligations on all Member States when implementing the
Agreement, and the judicial bodies when interpreting it.115 In addition, the doctrine of abus
de droit, as a derivative of the good faith principle, may give rise to substantive obligations,
even though such obligations are again not expressly acknowledged within the text of the
Agreement. Consequently, by connecting Article 7 with the principle of good faith, the panel,
in US- s211, legally obliges Member States and those interpreting the Agreement to conduct
112
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‘a balancing of rights and obligations.’ This increases significantly the relevance of this
provision and its future application.
However, it must be emphasised that Article 7 is not a tool for eroding the rights granted
under the TRIPS Agreement, but for controlling those rights in a way that facilitates
achieving the other objectives expressed in Article 7. As noted by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss: [Article 7’s] endorsement of the goal of promoting technological innovation and
achieving the “mutual advantage of producers and users” equally safeguards right
holder’s interests in effective protection. Thus, a member state might challenge a
provision that undermines the innovative environment on the ground that it shifts
the balance too far in favor of users. Article 7 is, in short, not a commitment to
any particular vision of intellectual property.116

Nevertheless, as noted above, it is a commitment to national autonomy: [Article 7] is a structural commitment that helps define the parameters in which
members states can make different intellectual property choices appropriate to
their needs.117

(b) Summary

Article 7 articulates the objectives of the intellectual property system that have up to this
point been implicit within both national and international systems. Their express inclusion
within the TRIPS Agreement therefore provides significant insight into the intentions of the
drafters of the Agreement. As recognised by Pedro Roffe: In litigation concerning intellectual property rights, courts commonly seek the
underlying objectives of the national legislator, asking the purpose behind
establishing a particular right. Article 7 makes clear that TRIPS negotiators did
116
117
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not intend to abandon a balanced perspective on the role of intellectual property
rights in society.118
The clear intention is to position intellectual property within the context of not only the WTO
trading system but also the wider context of national development. Article 7 ensures that the
objectives as stated are not forgotten or ignored in the push for internationally liberalised
trade.
As a set of interpretative principles they permit and arguably require legislative and legal
interpreters to target national intellectual property laws towards achieving the stated
outcomes. They logically facilitate domestic flexibility over intellectual property strategy. 119
Although Article 7 does not give authority to renegotiate the terms of the TRIPS
Agreement,120 it does authorise a degree of variation between Member States to
accommodate other national and international policies. In its role towards promoting
innovation, dissemination, social and economic welfare and a balance of rights and
obligations, Article 7 displays an equal responsibility towards the protection of intellectual
property rights and the wider economic and social impact. That responsibility would appear
to be one that may carry with it legal consequences in the form of the principle of good faith.

3. Article 8 - Principles

Principle: - A fundamental truth or proposition, on which many others depend; a
primary truth comprehending or forming the basis of, various subordinate truths;
a general statement or tenet forming the (or a ) ground of, or held to be essential
to, a system of thought or belief; a fundamental assumption forming the basis of a
chain of reasoning.121
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The dictionary definition of ‘principle’ seeks to emphasise the foundational nature of the
proposition being advanced. It makes clear that a principle is to be regarded as the
motivational force behind the line of thought or the course of action being championed. In
this regard, Article 8 is complementary to Article 7 in that it underlines the motive and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, if we take this understanding of principle and
place it into the context of a legal agreement we can see that the more general understanding
can now be refined into that of a legal norm.
Legal principles are recognized as ‘general, basic or underlying assumptions or precepts
[that] embody fundamental regulatory purposes or values and provide a broad guide for the
development of legal rules.’122 Hence, they are distinct from legal rules, which lay down a
series of explicit rights and obligations that are ‘applicable in an all or nothing fashion.’123 As
highlighted in the dictionary definition above, principles articulate the fundamental basis or
truth of any legal system.124 In that regard, we can isolate two functions for legal principles.
First, they encompass legal concepts that guide the application of the relevant rules.
Secondly, they validate, justify and thus legitimise the scope of any legal regime. To ignore
legal principles ‘implies offence not only to a specific command, but to the whole system of
commands.’125
As a guide to the application of legal rules, principles step in to fill the textual gaps that
are an inevitable reality of any legal system. It is impossible to provide explicit guidance for
every eventuality that might be encompassed by its rules.126 This is especially so in the
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international arena where the inherent difficulties in reaching agreement on often complex
subject matter leads to ambiguity or even silence in relation to many of the rights and
obligations included.127 Hence, the most significant role for legal principles rests in providing
more or less broadly defined guidance for identifying the correct interpretation to be
attributed to an ambiguous rule.
The TRIPS Agreement consists of both principles as well as rules. In the preamble to the
TRIPS Agreement Members recognise ‘the need for new rules and disciplines concerning the
provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of
trade-related intellectual property rights’ and ‘the need for a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods.’128
These principles exist in addition to the structural principles that traverse all WTO treaties,
such as trade liberalisation, non-discrimination and special and differential treatment.129
Therefore, it would appear fortunate for the process of treaty interpretation that, in
addition to the substantive rules of the Agreement, Members took steps to define a set of
‘principles’ within the operative section of the text. These principles are to apply when a
Member State chooses to adopt measures pursuant to the objectives expressed within Article
8. This approach would mirror that adopted in relation to other provisions within other WTO
Agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For example,
Article XXXVI of the GATT, entitled ‘Principles and Objectives’ has been held out as
containing horizontally applicable principles. Notably, paragraph 8 expresses the principle of
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non-reciprocity130 and, as stated in the explanatory notes, ‘This paragraph would apply in the
event of action under Section A of Article XVIII, Article XXVIII, Article
XXVIII bis,... Article XXXIII, or any other procedure under this Agreement.’131
Article 8, like Article 7, acknowledges the need for the socio-economic optimisation of
intellectual property regulation. It implicitly recognizes that intellectual property protection
often demands interventionist action to ensure that it does protect and/or promote social and
economic objectives. Nevertheless, unlike Article 7, Article 8 expressly authorises State
Parties to take specific action in pursuit of explicit, yet broadly defined, policy objectives.132
Consequently, Article 8 would appear to be of greater substantive value than its neighbouring
provision, Article 7. As observed by Carlos Correa, ‘Article 8 thus confirms the broad and
unfettered discretion that Members have to pursue public policy objectives.’133
However, Article 8 was clearly not intended to be an exception to the exclusive rights
granted by the Agreement. Both paragraphs of Article 8 require that any measures adopted by
Member must be consistent with the rest of the Agreement. Yet, it is important to assert that
the consistency requirement should not overwhelm the application of this provision. To argue
otherwise portrays intellectual property protection as ascendant over other national policies,
and risks making Article 8 a superfluous provision contrary to established principles of
international law. This cannot be the case. 134 As will be shown from the analysis of the
terminology adopted, Article 8 articulates to Member States the significant discretion, even in
light of the consistency requirement, that they hold to accommodate other important socioeconomic objectives. In doing so, it articulates principles that clearly assist in interpreting and
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applying the substantive rules of the Agreement, most significant of which are national
regulatory autonomy, consistency, necessity and reasonableness.

(a) The Terms of Article 8.1

(i) ‘Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary...’

The opening phrase of Article 8 plainly recognises the independence State Parties have to
institute suitable measures to control some of the negative consequences of intellectual
property protection. These can arise either as a result of an intentional manipulation of the
system or as an intrinsic side-effect of granting exclusive rights protection. It also recognises
that intellectual property rights should not form a barrier to the regulation of other social and
economic policy objectives. Such measures include the adaptation of intellectual property
laws themselves,135 but may also include controls in other areas that impact upon the exercise
of intellectual property rights, such as price controls and safety standards.136 However, as the
measures relate to the formulation or amendment of ‘laws and regulations’ it can be assumed
that administrative actions could not be justified under Article 8.1.137
The measures that may be taken could ostensibly support an increase in the levels of
intellectual property protection. The key requirement being that the law is directed towards
achieving the stated purposes, that is ‘to promote public health and nutrition, and to promote
135

Aspects of TRIPS that provide flexibility for such measures include the exceptions to the rights granted
(articles 13, 17 and 30); the lack of definitions for many of the substantive requirements (i.e. article 27 requires
patentable subject matter to be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial application); and in
relation to patent law, article 31 provides for the grant of compulsory licences.
136
Correa (n 5) 104; Andrés Moncayo von Hase, ‘The Application and Interpretation of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual
Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International 2008) 117.
137
Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 195.

34

the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development.’ This is supported by Article 1.1 which states that, ‘Members may, but shall not
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by the
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement.’ For example, enhanced protection of traditional knowledge is directly aimed at
attaining the stated objectives because it seeks to preserve traditional lifestyles and improve
livelihoods, to conserve the environment, benefit national economies, and prevent biopiracy.138 Nevertheless, it is as an instrument to overcome the obstacles to development
created by intellectual property protection that Article 8.1 could be most influential.
Therefore, an effective operationalisation of this provision would likely see a reduction in the
level of protection afforded.
The use of the term ‘necessary’ within Article 8.1 mirrors the wording within other
WTO texts, where, as the ‘necessity test,’ it functions to control the autonomy State Parties
have to ensure non-trade objectives.139 It attempts to distinguish between, or at least lessen
the impact of, those national measures that legitimately pursue a non-trade objective (and as a
consequence create barriers to free trade) and those protectionist policies that merely
masquerade as sanctioned trade exceptions. It does this by ensuring that domestic measures
that restrict trade are only tolerated if they are ‘necessary’ to mitigate against the obstruction
of a fundamental national policy objective. For this reason, it is evident that the necessity test
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in Article 8.1 is a limitation placed on Member States when acting under the authority of this
provision. The other being the ‘consistency’ proviso, which will be discussed below.
‘Necessity’ as interpreted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) objectively
requires that the domestic measure pursue a policy expressed within the relevant provision. In
the case of Article 8.1 that means public health and nutrition, and/or the promotion of the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological
development. However, the jurisprudence of the WTO dictates that domestic measures which
restrict trade will only be considered necessary (and thus WTO compliant) where, as
summarised by Ruse-Khan, ‘they consist of the least trade restrictive measure; which is
reasonably available to the Member State; and is equally effective in achieving the desired
policy objective.’140 The Appellate Body has confirmed that it is not essential to show that
the measure is ‘indispensable’ to achieving the objective, a more lenient and deferential
approach has been adopted. In Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and
Frozen Beef, the Appellate Body confirmed that it involved a ‘weighing and balancing’ of
several factors including, ‘the contribution made by the compliance measure to the
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or
regulation on imports or exports.’141
The Appellate Body in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline has acknowledged that the policy objective pursued by State Parties is not the focus
of the necessity requirement, but the measure adopted to pursue that objective is. This
approach leaves Members free to determine their own policies in relation to objectives
140
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expressed. 142 The level of self-determination was further enhanced in European Communities
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products when the Appellate Body
confirmed that State Parties also retain the ‘right to determine the level of protection [in
relation to the relevant policy] that it considers appropriate in a given situation.’143
Having observed that the policy objective is not justiciable, only the measure itself, it is
important to note that the underlying policy is considered relevant when adjudicating on the
necessity of the measure in question.144 The ‘weighing and balancing’ exercise offsets the
relative importance of the national interest being advanced against the effectiveness of the
measure and the extent of its impact upon trade.145 Sarah Joseph has observed that in the
above cases ‘the Appellate Body has signalled a great willingness to concede the necessity of
impugned measures when public health issues are at stake.’146 As considered below, this is
significant for the application of the necessity test in Article 8.1, where ‘public health’ is
prominent amongst the listed objectives. And while the WTO has stressed that Members must
‘respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements,’147
one would assume this includes the necessity requirement, which clearly mitigates the level
of ‘respect’ commanded when acting in the interests of public health and the other interests
outlines in Article 8.1.
Much of the case law in this area deals with the necessity standard as required by the
‘General Exception’ provisions in Article XX(b) and (d) of the GATT, and Article XIV of the
GATS. However, it would not be accurate to presume that the interpretation applied to the
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necessity requirement in these instruments can be directly transposed onto the TRIPS
Agreement. In fact it has been supposed that the necessity requirement in Article 8.1 is not as
restrictive as that in Article XX of the GATT. 148 This is because Members, in ‘promot[ing]
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development’, would appear to have ‘significant room to define domestically the content and
scope of the measures they can adopt.’149 The broad mandate expressed in Article 8.1 is also
supported by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which declares that ‘the
TRIPS Agreement does not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.’
It is also noteworthy that State Parties did not deem it necessary to restrict state action in this
regard by including a requirement of necessity within the Doha Declaration.150
This understanding aside, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that Article 8.1 is
an ‘exceptions’ provision like Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV, GATS. Whilst all
three articles include a list of potentially trade-restrictive measures that Members may adopt
together with a necessity requirement, it is only the General Exceptions in the GATT and
GATS that allow Members to directly override their obligations under the Agreements.151
Article 8.1 is constrained by the requirement that all measures must be ‘consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.’152 As a result, it would appear that Members may only adopt
such public interest measures if they can find sufficient space within the TRIPS provisions to
do so.153
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Therefore, while the underlying function of the necessity test is to constrain the amount
of discretion Member States have in relation to public policy objectives, its limiting affect
may be inconsequential by comparison to the obligation of TRIPS consistency. Hence, if a
measure is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement it is unlikely to be challenged irrespective
of its ‘necessity’ to achieve the stated objective.154 Nevertheless, the ‘necessity’ requirement
may have greater application should non-violation complaints become recognised within the
context of the TRIPS regime.155
Unlike violation complaints which involve a breach of the terms of a WTO treaty, nonviolation complaints arise where a state alleges that the expectation of a ‘benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly ...is being nullified or impaired’ or ‘the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded’ by ‘the application by another contracting party of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement.’156 Therefore,
Member States may bring a complaint before the DSB where the action being taken by
another Member is not illegal per se (does not violate an express treaty term), yet it does deny
a legitimately expected gain arising from the Agreement.
Notwithstanding the present inapplicability of non-violation complaints in the context of
the TRIPS Agreement, it is clear that Article 8 may prove to be most valuable in this context.
Member States who wish to adopt TRIPS consistent measures pursuant to the objectives
expressed within this provision, such as price controls, licensing restrictions or packaging
requirements, can use this provision as a defence against a claim that they were impairing the
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legitimate benefits expected under the TRIPS Agreement.157 As explained below, Article 8 is
an expression of the expectations of Members in relation to the Agreement and thus
‘indicates that [Members] were reasonably expected to adopt such TRIPS-consistent
measures.’158 The only restraint that could have a significant bearing would be the ‘necessity
test’. This would operate to ensure that the adopted measure did not exceed what was
objectively justified in the circumstances.

(ii) ‘to protect public health and nutrition,...’

Article 8.1 makes clear that the measures taken by Member States are to be directed to
achieving certain ends, the first being to protect public health and nutrition. As stated by the
2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.159

This Declaration supports the ability of State Parties to take measures in support of
public health160 that may, in fact, limit the grant and protection of intellectual property rights.
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Nevertheless the scope of Members’ discretion is seemingly constrained by the second
sentence in the Declaration which acknowledges the use of flexibilities within the Agreement
itself for achieving their public health objectives.161 This interpretation would appear to be in
harmony with the requirement in Article 8.1 that any national measures are consistent with
the provision of the TRIPS Agreement. However, as will be discussed below, this may not be
so restrictive as it first appears.

(iii)‘and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development,...’

This is the second purpose to which Member State Parties may direct their necessary
measures. It is immediately evident that national measures, in this context, need only
‘promote’ the public interest rather than actually achieve the stated objective.162 As a result,
any challenge to the legitimacy of such action will be much harder to establish. It is also clear
from the language used that this second objective is extremely broad in its scope. Given that
the measures adopted may include those within the scope of the intellectual property regime
and those without, Carlos Correa has highlighted the significant room this provides for States
when implementing and adapting their intellectual property policies.163
The ‘public interest’ is a phrase often used to rationalise political, governmental and
legal decision making at both the national and international level.164 Yet, it is a concept that
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appears devoid of a precise definition.165 The Oxford English Dictionary identifies it as ‘the
common well-being’166 and is broadly understood to convey the message that the action or
inaction in question has been undertaken because society, as a whole, will derive a benefit.
As we have seen, intellectual property and trade are certainly sectors within which the public
interest can be advanced. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not attempt to define any
optimum levels of well-being to be targeted. In fact, it would be wrong to suppose that the
‘public interest’ could be subject to an internationally recognised measure or definition.
While political debates and judicial interpretations often provide context specific
understandings of the term,167 perceptions of ‘common well-being’ and the philosophical
origins of the ‘public interest’ inevitably vary amongst states. National perceptions of public
interest are tied to economic, cultural, political and historical influences that are as numerous
as they are variable.168 Accordingly, it is a reference point that policy makers can only
legitimately begin to determine at the national level.169
Turning to the phrase ‘of vital importance,’ once again it is only the individual Member
States that can determine which sectors are of vital importance to their own socio-economic
and technological development and thus where to take relevant action. While the term ‘vital
importance’ would seem to stress the imperative nature of the sector in question, it is only the
Member State who can determine which sectors are important to ‘their socio-economic and
technological development.’170 As observed by Peter Yu, the only significant restriction on
scope seems to come from within Article 27.1 of the patent provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, which requires non-discrimination as to ‘the place of invention, the field of
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technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.’171 Although, he does
emphasis that this may not be relevant where sectors are identified not on the basis of their
technological specialism, but on their size or stage of development, i.e. infant or small to
medium-sized businesses.172
Finally, the phrase ‘socio-economic and technological development’ must be seen to
cover all aspects of a nation’s growth, and reflects the objectives outlined in the fifth recital
of the Preamble to the Agreement.173 It is difficult if not impossible to conceive of an area of
development that would not fall within the categories of social, economic or technological; or
an area of intellectual property that would not be impacted by action taken under Article
8.1.174 When deciding whether a sector is of ‘vital importance’ it is therefore possible for a
Member State to look beyond the traditional indicators of development, such as Gross
Domestic Product, income levels and total employment, and towards social indicators such as
levels of health and education.175 As discussed above in relation to Article 7, technological
development is a fundamental objective of intellectual property protection and the TRIPS
Agreement. Yet, Article 8.1, together with Article 7, underscores that intellectual property
protection can never prevail where to do so undermines other development objectives.

(iv) ‘provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’

This has proved to be the most controversial expression within this provision. Article 8
makes national autonomy to adopt appropriate measures conditional upon their compliance
with the rest of the Agreement. At first sight it would be reasonable to conclude that Article
171
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8.1 is therefore almost redundant in application. However, this conclusion is drawn from too
strict a reading of the proviso. While Article 8.1 may not be a ‘general exception’ provision
analogous to Article XX of the GATT, this does not mean that the provision is of
insignificance. Together with Article 1.1 and Article 7, this provision has been described as a
‘functional substitute’ to the General Exception provision of the GATT.176 Like Article 7,
Article 8 has an interpretative function.177 It guides the national legislator when faced with
implementing the often ambiguously worded substantive rules of the TRIPS Agreement. If
we analyse the consistency requirement of Article 8 in light of the conditions placed upon the
grant of exceptions to the exclusive rights, we can see that ‘consistency’ may not, in fact, be
so hard to achieve given the uncertain nature of the exception provisions. For example,
copyright limitations and exceptions should ‘not conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work;178 copyright and trade mark exceptions must ‘take account of the legitimate interests of
the owner;’179 and patent exceptions must ‘not unreasonably conflict with the normal
exploitation’ of the right and must ‘not prejudice the legitimate interest of the owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.’180 In this interpretative role, Article 8
skews in favour of the wider public interest when it comes into conflict with intellectual
property policy.181 How the exceptions within the TRIPS Agreement are interpreted is
important for giving practical application to the principles expressed in Article 8.182
In addition, Article 8 governs the interaction between intellectual property regulation and
measures taken outside of intellectual property law and policy, for example competition
regulation and public health. Correa notes that it would be illogical to suppose that the
consistency requirement should prevent any TRIPS-inconsistent measures to protect the
176
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national interests outlined in Article 8.1, as this would see intellectual property rights gain
ascendency over other national policy objectives.183 In support of this opinion, the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health affirms that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Yet, as discussed, this is seemingly
limited by the second sentence of paragraph 4, which reaffirms the right of Members to use
the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement for this purpose. In addition, the Doha
understanding only relates to matters of public health and is not directly relevant for the other
policy objectives expressed within Article 8.1.184 In these situations there is no express
support for dispensing with the consistency requirement. Nevertheless, Correa is right to
argue that intellectual property protection should and does not assume primacy over other
policies. In which case, it may be better to acknowledge that the consistency requirement is
there not because negotiators intended intellectual property rights to trump other national
policies, but as an indicator that there is sufficient room within the other provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement to accommodate those policies whilst also respecting the protection of
intellectual property rights.185 Therefore, returning to the first point above, Article 8.1 is an
interpretative tool that asserts the rights of Members to favour other policies should the
national situation so dictate, and that any challenge to Members discretion should carry the
burden of establishing that the measure is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.186 As
observed by Andres Moncayo von Hase, ‘Articles 7 and 8 impose on Members the
correlative obligation to refrain from questioning acts of other Members that make use of the
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freedom conferred to them by the said provisions.’187 Consequently the consistency proviso
appears to merely determine the outer limits of that discretion rather than removing it
completely.188
Importantly, when assessing the consistency of such measures it must be remembered
that Article 7, and its requirements of social and economic welfare and a balance of rights
and obligations, must be taken into account as the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.189
‘Consistent with the provisions of this Agreement’ means all the provisions, including Article
7. Therefore, the consistency enquiry cannot ignore that the optimum levels of intellectual
property protection relate to national levels of development, as required by Article 7, which
must necessarily include ‘public health and nutrition’ and ‘socio-economic and technological
development.’ A national measure which may appear inconsistent with some of the standards
expressed within the TRIPS Agreement may not be considered inconsistent with the
Agreement if read as a whole.190
In conclusion, the consistency requirement means that Article 8.1 is not a General
Exceptions provision akin to Article XX of the GATT, as it does not generally authorise
Members to override the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (notwithstanding that the
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health may make an exception for public health
policies) and it appears to have no substantive application on its own.191 However, it does not
prevent Members from adapting their intellectual property laws to accommodate the stated
policy concerns where ambiguity or flexibility exists within the substantive provisions of the
Agreement. As long as one or more of the stated objectives is the genuine intention behind
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the measure and is not a disguised attempt to weaken the protection provided by the TRIPS
Agreement, states are free to act.192

(b) Article 8.2

(i) ‘Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed...’

While Article 8.1 authorises measures ‘of a positive nature’, Article 8.2, authorises Member
States to take ‘defensive’ action to prevent or resolve any adverse consequences created by
the behaviour of intellectual property rights owners.193 As with Article 8.1, this provision
requires that national measures taken upon the authority of this provision must be consistent
with the rest of the Agreement. Therefore, competition law should not be used as a hidden
restraint on the rights provided by the TRIPS Agreement.194 In this regard, the discussion in
relation to the consistency proviso in Article 8.1 is equally relevant here.
One noticeable difference between the authorisation provided by Articles 8.1 and 8.2 is
that the former requires such measures to be ‘necessary’, whereas the latter requires the
measures to be ‘appropriate’ and ‘needed’. Given that the term ‘necessary’ denotes a specific
legal norm within the WTO and ‘appropriate’ does not, it is possible to presume that
Members may be afforded greater autonomy when it comes to adopting measures under
Article 8.2, subject to the consistency requirement. Gervais advances the argument that
‘“appropriate” refers to the need for correlation between the measure (nature and
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proportionality) and the abuse or unreasonable restraint that is its target.’195 If this
‘correlation’ requires a proportionality type assessment similar to that discussed in relation to
the ‘necessity’ test then there would seem little reason for departing from the terminology
adopted in Article 8.1.196 Hence, it would seem logical, and in accordance with principles of
treaty interpretation, to conclude that ‘appropriate’ signifies a lesser level of scrutiny for
national measures. An alternative explanation for this distinction may be that, unlike the
policy objectives listed in Article 8.1, the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual
arrangements is covered in some detail by Article 40 of the Agreement. This makes it
unnecessary for Article 8.2 to include a further limitation when the discretion afforded to
Member States is controlled by another provision. Although, it must be noted that the level
of direction afforded by Article 40 is far from comprehensive.
The term ‘needed’ has also been equated with that of ‘necessary’ in Article 8.1, 197 and
there is certainly a relationship between the ordinary understanding given to both terms. Yet,
once again we must question why State Parties chose to depart from the use of the word
necessary, and thus the established WTO ‘necessity’ principle, if there was no intention to
adopt a different benchmark. It is reasonable to argue that ‘needed’ may merely refer to a
requirement for Member States to show that some action was required and thus the measure
was adopted in good faith.198 Nevertheless, what is clear from the discussion below is that
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Member States can only intervene under this provision when the activities of private owners
produce negative effects for competition, trade or technology transfer.199

(ii) ‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders...’

The TRIPS Agreement was introduced to remedy perceived distortions to competition that a
lack of adequate intellectual property protection was having in the market place.200 In this
regard intellectual property protection is an important aspect of a competitive trading
environment.201 Yet, the exclusive rights granted to intellectual property owners can also be
abused to produce negative consequences for trade and competition both nationally and
internationally.202 Indeed, during the Uruguay Round, it was this aspect alone that India felt
needed regulating by the WTO (or the GATT as it was at the time). As stated by the Indian
delegation, ‘it was only the restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of
intellectual property rights that can be considered to be trade-related because they alone
distort or impede international trade.’203 Consequently, the initial proposals to incorporate
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provisions relating to anti-competitive practices came from developing countries.204 It is the
balance between appropriate levels of intellectual property protection and competition
regulation that the opening recital to the TRIPS Agreement seeks to attain.205 In this regard,
the regulation of intellectual property rights in accordance with competition policy is seen by
the WTO Membership as essential to ensure the effectiveness of the system.
Article 8.2 allows the overall balance between intellectual property protection and
competition rules to be resolved at the national level. It neither attempts to define what
practices are to be considered abusive, nor stipulates what measures Members should adopt.
It once again exhibits deference to national policy makers to tailor rules and principles to suit
national circumstances.206 This is an approach favoured by some commentators who view
WTO regulation of competition rules as potentially restrictive for many nations, and the
WTO unsuitable for the task.207 In discussing the impact of implementing multilateral rules
and principles on competition policy, Correa maintains that ‘The best option for [developing]
countries may be to keep the possibility of establishing their competition regimes, according
to their own situation and policy objectives, without being bound to rules that may be
enforced through the WTO settlement mechanism.’208
The ability to control abusive practices can be addressed from within the TRIPS regime
itself. As noted above, there is significant ambiguity in many of the substantive rules to allow
Members to adopt pro-competitive intellectual property policies. In addition, Article 40
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authorises Members to regulate anti-competitive licensing practices of rights holders;209
Article 6 on exhaustion of rights allows Member States to adopt their own policy and
regulation on the matter;210and the rules, for example, on fair use and compulsory licensing
also expressly assist to counter abusive practices.211
Beyond intellectual property policy, abusive practices can be subject to varying degrees
of national regulation. The abuse of rights is a concept that has been notoriously difficult to
universally define. In the absence of a multilateral agreement on competition rules and
policy, 212 members are free to determine what practices are to be defined as abusive and how
to regulate them.213 Thus, taken together with Article 7, this provision would allow Member
States to utilise competition rules to ensure that intellectual property rights holders are not
over-compensated in relation to their social and economic contribution.

(iii)‘or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade...’

Here again Article 8.2 is formulated to allow Member States the autonomy to regulate the
practices of private business. The intention is to prevent activities that impact upon the
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fundamental objective of WTO policy – unrestricted trade.214 There is clearly an overlap
between this objective and the previous concern over abuse of rights. Yet, the ability to
control abusive practices would appear to be wider given that some abusive practices may not
in fact be considered anti-competitive and thus not an unreasonable restraint on trade,
whereas any anti-competitive practice will always be abusive.215
The term reasonable (or variations of, including unreasonably) appears more than 200
times in the legal texts of the WTO, and over 30 in the TRIPS Agreement.216 It is often used
as a means to limit the nature and extent of measures States are authorised to make.217 As in
Article 8.2, States are only authorised to act if the practice in question unreasonably restrains
trade. Within the context of the TRIPS Agreement, Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg
observe that the ‘unreasonableness’ of an action or inaction requires an assessment of
whether or not it is ‘proportionate or within the limits of reason.’218
Whether a practice ‘unreasonably’ restrains trade appears to require the Member State to
undertake an investigation into the actual impact the conduct has upon trade before adopting
any pro-competitive measures that may negatively affect intellectual property rights. As
emphasised by the much quoted Justice Brandeis in the 1918 US Supreme Court decision in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, every contractual agreement restrains trade to
some extent it is only those that do so unreasonably that warrant legal scrutiny.219 What
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amounts to unreasonable restraint was articulated in what has become commonly known as
the ‘rule of reason’ doctrine: The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.220

While this private law doctrine has necessarily evolved over time, and finds application in
many jurisdictions, the essence of the analysis remains true today.221 Therefore, this
established balancing test would appear equally applicable for WTO Members when making
a determination as to whether certain restrictive intellectual property practices warrant
regulatory measures to be taken.222

(iv) ‘or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.’

Conduct of intellectual property owners that could affect the international transfer of
technology include many of the licensing practices covered by Article 40, and the grant of
compulsory licences in accordance with Article 31. As expressed in Article 7, one of the
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is the ‘transfer and dissemination of technology.’ This
220
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was a key factor in persuading many developing countries to agree to the TRIPS Agreement
being incorporated into the legal framework of the WTO. Given that the main source of
technology transfer for many developing countries is that acquired from overseas,223 it was
crucial that developing Members were given the tools to ensure, as far as possible, that the
promised benefits of intellectual property protection accrued. In this regard Article 8.2,
together with Article 66.2, are important provisions that seek to promote the international
transfer of technology.224 Yet it is only the former provision that places credible control in the
hands of all recipient nations.

(c) Summary

In sanctioning Member States to adopt measures in relation to certain policy objectives
Article 8 appears to have greater substantive authority than its neighbouring provision,
Article 7. Yet this authority is curtailed by the inclusion of a consistency requirement. While
the controls of necessity and reasonableness merely seek to ensure that the measures adopted
are not disguised restrictions on trade, the consistency requirement seemingly prevents
Article 8 having free-standing authority to directly override other obligations expressed
within the TRIPS Agreement. In requiring consistency Article 8 acts as a ‘rule of restraint
for national policies.’ But just how restraining is that rule? The policy objectives expressed
within the provision are wide in scope and not clearly defined, leaving Members significant
discretion on how to develop that policy. In addition, the provisions within the Agreement
that Members could use to support a consistency argument, i.e. Articles 13, 17, 30 and 40, are
themselves open to broad interpretation in light of the objectives and principles expressed in
223
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Articles 7 and 8. As noted by Reichman, ‘In principle, both the public interest exception and
measures to prevent abuse, respectively stipulated in Article 8(1) and 8(2) of the TRIPS
Agreement, could justify resort to compulsory licensing.’225 Therefore, the consistency
requirement may not be as restrictive as it first appears.
Accordingly, the true value of Article 8 rests in its ability to guide the interpretation of
other provisions of the Agreement. Many provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are vague and
uncertain in legal application and thus would benefit from the guidance provided by Article
8, even if it is only to authorise deference to national standards where such measures are
adopted in good faith. Therefore, Article 8 is a complementary provision to Article 7 that is
important for framing not only intellectual property laws but also rules relating to other
public interests such as health and competition.226

(d) Identified Principles of Law
The WTO Panel in EC – TMs & GIs has acknowledged that ‘Article 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement sets out the principles of that agreement.’227 This is important in understanding
the legal authority of this provision. As observed by Andrew Mitchell, ‘a text supporting two
readings should be interpreted in a manner consonant with a treaty’s underlying
principles.’228 Thus, when specific legal principles can be identified within the text of an
agreement they inevitably carry greater interpretative weight than the more general
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expressions of object and purpose.229 Notwithstanding that the interpretation and application
of these legal principles is still influenced by the overall object and purpose of the treaty.
While the panel does not identify any specific legal principles emanating from Article 8,
it is clear from the above analysis that each of the requirements of consistency, necessity and
reasonableness operate as legal principles. In this role they guide the application of the
relevant legal rules and, in doing so, validate and justify the scope of the Agreement. Yet, it
would be wrong to let the nomenclature of Article 8 be so restrictive as to deny that same role
to its neighbour, Article 7. As mentioned above, the Panel in US – Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 characterised the phrase ‘[t]he protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute...to a balance of rights and obligations’
contained within Article 7 as a ‘form of the good faith principle.’230
In addition, it is also possible to identify a legal principle that finds its origins in the
language of both Articles 7 and 8. The principle of national regulatory autonomy or
sovereignty is clearly a guiding principle in several key policy areas, such as health and
competition, and when implementing the often ambiguous obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement. As discussed throughout this paper, the policy objectives of the TRIPS
Agreement can only be truly defined and balanced at the national level. While the principles
of consistency, necessity and reasonableness may limit the scope of that autonomy, any
challenge to the principle of national regulatory autonomy must necessarily carry the burden
of establishing the action or inaction as inconsistent, unnecessary, etc.
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The legal principles so far identified as being expressed within both Articles 7 and 8 are
reasonably unambiguous in their objectives, and relatively familiar to judicial adjudicators.
However, this is not to say that their boundaries and application will be or are easy to define.
Caution must be stressed in an intergovernmental organisation such as the WTO, where the
Dispute Settlement Understanding makes it clear that the ‘Recommendations and rulings of
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.’231 Nevertheless, this caution must be balanced against the need to recognise the
legal and interpretative principles as articulated by its members. Given that these principles
are expressed within Articles 7 and 8 it is significant that the terms of reference of the DSU
require that any matter of dispute be examined ‘in the light of the relevant provisions of the
covered agreements.’232
In summary, legal principles are plainly expressed within both Articles 7 and 8, although
it is only the principle of ‘good faith’ that has been definitively recognised by the DSB.
Whilst above the analysis is not conclusive, it is reasonable to presume that the legal
principles that have been identified can effectively function to guide the interpretation of the
substantive rules of the Agreement. This guidance derives from a direct use of the legal
principle to shape the applicable rule. If applied in this way, the legal principles articulated in
Articles 7 and 8 give expression to the broader intentions of all the parties to the Agreement.
Article 7 and 8, therefore, demarcate the scope of the Agreement and legitimise its
application amongst all Member States. They also provide the foundation for some of the
expectations that Members should derive from the implementation of the Agreement and are
therefore important provisions should non-violation complaints become an aspect of the
TRIPS Agreement.
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4. Conclusion

In conceptualising the meaning and function of Articles 7 and 8 from the language of the text,
it seems evident that these provisions should be of fundamental importance in defining the
scope of the TRIPS Agreement. As expressed by Meinhard Hilf, ‘Any established rule in a
legal system should be an expression of a finely tuned balance between the underlying
principles and objectives.’233 This approach is in accordance with the General Rule of Treaty
Interpretation expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
requiring inter alia that a treaty be interpreted in light of its object and purpose. Therefore,
Articles 7 and 8, entitled Objectives and Principles, provide a system that calibrates the rest
of the TRIPS Agreement. Analysis of the text also confirms that this process of calibration
can only sensibly be achieved at the national level given the breadth and complexity of social
and economic issues in question. Therefore, where ambiguity exists within the provisions of
the Agreement deference must be made to the individual choices of member states, as long as
they are aimed at achieving the goals articulated in Article 7 or are authorised by Article 8.234
In addition, the outcomes that these provisions seek to achieve reflect a balance of
interests arising from an extensive period of negotiations and to ignore them makes it ‘very
hard to make a good faith argument that the TRIPS Agreement was a legitimate bargain
between developed and less-developed countries.’235 As tools for validating and justifying the
scope of the TRIPS Agreement it is important to recognise that they also implicitly
incorporate the development goals of the WTO. 236 Yet this is not to misconstrue these
provisions as instruments that only have value for the less developed membership of the
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WTO. Clearly Articles 7 and 8 also reflect intellectual property policy that has long been a
staple of national regimes. Whether as expressing legal principles, legitimate expectations or
defining the outcomes of an optimised intellectual property regime, these two provisions
provide important interpretative guidance to all members and institutions of the WTO.
Greater trust in the value of the TRIPS Agreement can only be achieved through the
application of its objectives and principles, which can only effectively be applied once a
better understanding has been articulated. It is hoped that this article goes some way to
providing much clarity to the text, such that legal and political representatives can have
greater confidence in their future application. Given that the text of Articles 7 and 8 is being
steadily replicated in other intellectual property agreements, it is only through an
understanding of these objectives and principles that we fully appreciate how international
intellectual property regulation is to function.
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